By Eirini Diamantara & Dimitris Roumeliotis
The past week has confirmed that the disruption in the Arabian Gulf is no longer just a supply shock but a market distortion that is beginning to erode demand itself. What initially supported freight through panic, dislocation and risk premiums is now evolving into something more complex: a shrinking cargo base, trapped tonnage and an increasingly fragmented tanker market.
On the crude side, the numbers are becoming difficult to ignore. With weekly volumes out of the Middle East Gulf down by as much as 65% and an estimated 100 tankers (>20.000 DWT) unable to exit the region (based on Signal Ocean Data), the market is effectively dealing with a logistical bottleneck rather than a pure shortage. The immediate reaction earlier this month — with extreme fixtures reported at record levels — reflected fear and scarcity. However, as days pass without a reopening of Hormuz, the reality is shifting toward lost earnings days, idle capacity and growing uncertainty around forward employment. This explains why forward expectations are already being revised down despite headline volatility. At the same time, policy responses are becoming increasingly unconventional. The US is now considering temporarily releasing up to 140 million barrels of Iranian oil already on the water, following a similar move on Russian cargoes. This is a clear signal that governments are prioritising short-term market stability over sanctions consistency. While this may ease prices in the near term, it also introduces a new layer of unpredictability, effectively blurring the boundaries of sanctioned trade and distorting normal market signals. What is perhaps more telling, however, is what is happening in the clean tanker space. Unlike crude, where dislocation can support tonne-miles, product tankers are facing a direct hit to demand. With Middle East Gulf refineries either damaged or unable to export, around 3.46 million barrels per day of product flows have been effectively removed from the market. The replacement volumes seen elsewhere — roughly 1 million barrels per day — are simply not enough to compensate. The result is not rerouting but contraction. This is already visible in vessel behaviour. LR and MR units are increasingly ballasting West, abandoning traditional East of Suez employment in search of alternative cargoes. While this initially supported Atlantic earnings, it is now creating the conditions for oversupply in the West. The early signs are there: rates remain historically strong, but momentum has clearly softened, particularly in the Pacific where earnings have corrected sharply from their peaks.
Overlaying all this is a sharp increase in bunker costs, which is acting as a further constraint on fleet mobility. With fuel prices surging and availability tightening, speculative repositioning becomes more expensive, effectively slowing down the system and reducing flexibility. This, combined with the growing imbalance between laden and ballast vessels inside the Gulf, is creating a market that is not only disrupted but inefficient.
Stepping back, the broader picture is one of a system under stress. The tanker market was already entering this period with an ageing fleet profile and limited immediate replacement capacity, a structural issue that remains in the background. What the current crisis has done is expose how quickly utilisation can break down when a key chokepoint is removed from the equation. For now, the market remains headline-strong but fundamentally fragile. The longer Hormuz stays effectively closed, the more the conversation will shift from freight spikes to demand destruction and utilisation losses. In that sense, this is no longer just a crisis of supply — it is a test of how much disruption the tanker market can absorb before its own fundamentals begin to weaken.
Data source: Xclusiv Shipbrokers Inc.