Ukraine’s grain export landscape

By Yiannis Parganas

While the war in Ukraine remains unresolved, any meaningful deescalation arising from ongoing peace discussions would extend well beyond energy markets and materially reshape Ukraine’s grain export landscape.

Indeed, the latest U.S.-backed peace discussions involving Ukrainian, European and Russian representatives signal that a negotiating track is at least active again, even if the outcome remains uncertain. For shipping, that matters because the biggest swing factor for Ukrainian corn and wheat is no longer agronomy alone, it is the cost, reliability and scalability of the export route map.

USDA’s December WASDE keeps Ukraine firmly positioned as a relevant supplier, but trims expectations. Ukraine’s coarse grain exports are pegged at 25.5 MMT (down from 27.59 MMT the month before) on a lower production outlook (35.58 MMT vs 38.58 MMT previously). Wheat exports for 2025/26 are seen at 14.5 MMT (from 15.0 MMT in November) with production steady at 23.0 MMT. These volumes remain structurally below pre-war benchmarks. In the seasons immediately preceding the conflict, Ukraine typically exported around 32–33 MMT of corn and approximately 18–21 MMT of wheat per year, supported by larger planted areas, stronger yields, and unrestricted access to deepsea Black Sea export infrastructure. The comparison underscores that, even with export corridors in place, Ukraine’s exportable surplus remains constrained relative to historical capacity, with the market continuing to factor in logistical, security, and operational frictions.

Where peace talks become relevant is in the “export friction premium.” If negotiations move into something more durable, ceasefire mechanics, clearer security guarantees, or simply fewer escalatory episodes, then Ukrainian exporters can re-optimize. Today, the system is engineered around resilience: multiple border exits, Danube solutions, smaller parcels, and a constant bias toward minimizing disruption risk. That keeps volumes moving, but it also caps efficiency (more transshipments, more queuing, more fragmented stems). A calmer risk environment would reshape trade dynamics. First, it would compress war-risk and insurance addons, immediately improve FOB competitiveness and widen the spectrum of workable destinations. Second, it would encourage more predictable loading programs at the main deep-sea outlets, allowing exporters and traders to plan further forward and consolidate cargoes with fewer “just-in-case” buffers. Third, it would likely redirect modal shares away from expensive workarounds and back toward the most economical water route for bulk grains, exactly where owners feel it in utilization and ballasting.

Trade flows already show how concentrated the demand pull is. A recent USDA/FAS update highlights that the EU and Türkiye have been absorbing a large share of Ukraine’s corn exports, with EU intake around 9.0 MMT and Türkiye about 5.7 MMT in the period discussed, evidence that regional, shorter-haul lanes are doing much of the heavy lifting. Those are classic Black Sea–Med / Black Sea–Continent runs that typically sit in the Handysize/ Supramax sweet spot. Peace-driven risk compression would not just raise volume potential; it can also change the cargo assembly and shipment size decisions that determine whether the marginal stem is a Handysize, a Supra, or something larger.

For charterers, the issue is execution rather than volume. Any easing of Black Sea risk would show up first in more regular Ukrainian loading programs, earlier forward selling by traders, and denser stems during peak corn weeks. That combination tends to firm up prompt demand in the East Med and nearby Continent, even if total export volumes do not immediately change.

If the war was to end, the dry bulk impact would be felt primarily in route structure and vessel mix, not in headline volumes. Ukrainian grain would shift back toward direct deep-sea loadings, reducing reliance on fragmented river and transshipment routes shifting a larger share of employment toward Panamax and Supramax vessels. Beyond the initial logistical normalization, a more stable operating environment would also support higher planted area, better input usage, and improved yields over time, laying the groundwork for a structurally larger export program in future seasons.

Data Source: Intermodal