The global economy has entered a new phase in which resilience is no longer measured by the absence of shocks, but by the ability to absorb one after another without losing momentum. The latest OECD Economic Outlook captures this unusual balance well: global growth has moderated, yet remained more resilient than initially expected; inflation is rising again, yet underlying pressures remain relatively contained; energy markets have been severely disrupted, yet significant shortages have so far been avoided; and financial conditions remain broadly supportive despite long-term borrowing costs reaching their highest levels in 15 years in many advanced economies. The difficulty is that resilience is not an infinite resource. The longer shocks persist, the more they consume the inventories, savings, fiscal space and policy flexibility that have so far cushioned their effects. That tension is already visible in the global growth numbers. The OECD estimates that global growth slowed to an annualised rate of 2.6 percent in the first half of 2026, from 3.6 percent in the second half of 2025, as the conflict in the Middle East sharply disrupted energy production and trade. Yet the transmission into the broader economy has been less severe than might have been expected. Oil inventories were drawn down, additional supplies were sourced from outside the Gulf, some economies switched towards alternative energy inputs, while governments reintroduced measures to cushion households and businesses from higher energy costs. At the same time, a very different force has been moving in the opposite direction. The extraordinary investment cycle surrounding artificial intelligence has continued to stimulate technology production, data-centre construction and trade, particularly across Asia, providing an increasingly important counterweight to the energy shock. The result is an unusual composition of global growth, in which one part of the economy is being driven by physical disruption, higher energy costs and the need to diversify supply chains, while another is being propelled by semiconductors, data centres and digital infrastructure. The OECD therefore still expects global GDP growth of 2.9 percent in 2026 and 3.0 percent in 2027, although the path between the two years is expected to be uneven, with momentum softening before gradually recovering as energy markets normalise.
This divergence is particularly important because the current shock is not simply reducing demand; it is rearranging its geography and composition. Energy remains the clearest transmission channel. Oil and gas prices have risen again as disruptions to Gulf production and exports intensified, while renewed threats to shipping through the Bab al-Mandab have added another layer of uncertainty. European gas inventories are at their lowest seasonal levels in more than 15 years, while global observed oil inventories in August were estimated to be around 507 million barrels below their February level. The immediate consequence is not merely a higher energy bill. More expensive fuel changes the economics of transportation, manufacturing and agriculture, encouraging consumers and industries to adjust both the commodities they use and the origins from which they source them. That adjustment is already visible across other commodity chains. Corn and wheat prices have risen markedly on weather concerns and continued disruption to Black Sea grain flows, while sulphur and petrochemical prices remain elevated. Fertiliser markets, by contrast, have been more mixed, with urea prices retreating from their April peak following the relaxation of Chinese export quotas. Commodity markets, in other words, are not moving as one complex: each supply chain is responding to its own combination of geopolitics, inventories, production capacity and substitution.
And substitution is precisely where the implications for global trade become more significant. When energy supplies are disrupted, consumers search for alternative fuels and suppliers. When agricultural production is threatened in one region, cargoes travel further from another. When inventories fall, restocking creates additional trade flows. The result can be more tonne-miles even when global GDP growth remains moderate. The issue is that every adjustment also creates a new vulnerability. The next potential shock may come not from geopolitics, but from the weather. The OECD highlights the possibility of a very strong El Niño, with the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration currently estimating a 95 percent probability for the October-December 2026 period. Such an event would have asymmetric consequences across commodityproducing regions, increasing the probability of drier conditions in Australia, a weaker Indian monsoon and drought conditions in Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia. The implications for agriculture could therefore be significant, with past strong El Niño episodes associated with higher global food commodity prices for as long as two years. At the same time, a warmer northern hemisphere winter could reduce energy demand and ease some pressure on European gas markets. Once again, the same shock can create winners and losers across different commodity chains, reinforcing the increasingly differentiated nature of global trade.
The OECD’s downside scenario shows what happens when these individual pressures begin to reinforce one another. If energy disruptions persist, food prices rise further, financial conditions tighten and technical efficiency is impaired by shortages, global growth could be reduced by 0.7 percentage points in 2027 while consumer price inflation could be 1.1 percentage points higher than in the baseline. Conversely, a faster normalisation of energy markets could produce the opposite effect, with a 10 percent decline in oil and gas prices from the fourth quarter of 2026 onwards estimated to add 0.1 percentage point to global growth in 2027 and reduce inflation by 0.3 percentage points. The baseline therefore remains one of moderation rather than contraction.
Yet the ability of households, companies and governments to absorb further shocks is becoming increasingly constrained. Household savings buffers are being depleted, real purchasing power is being eroded by higher energy prices, and long-term sovereign yields have climbed to levels not seen for many years. Higher borrowing costs are filtering through governments, businesses and households at precisely the moment when fiscal authorities are being asked to cushion another energy shock. Around one-third of central banks have raised policy rates since March, while several others have paused previous easing cycles. The result is a more complicated macroeconomic environment in which inflation and growth are once again pulling monetary policy in opposite directions. This is perhaps the defining feature of the current cycle. The global economy has demonstrated an impressive capacity to absorb successive shocks, but every adaptation carries a cost. Inventories can be drawn down, savings can be spent, alternative suppliers can be found and trade routes can be redirected – but none of these adjustments can continue indefinitely. The OECD’s message is therefore less about whether the global economy can withstand another shock than about how much unused capacity remains to absorb it.
Against this backdrop, the Trump-Xi meeting this week offered a small but relevant piece of stability rather than a fundamental change in the global economic landscape. The two sides agreed to extend their existing trade truce by two months, giving Washington and Beijing additional time for negotiations, while major differences over trade, technology and strategic issues remain unresolved. In a global system already being forced to absorb an energy shock, weather risks, higher financing costs and increasingly complex supply-chain adjustments, even the preservation of the existing trading framework has economic value. For shipping, this is ultimately the more important story. As supply chains adapt to successive disruptions, trade can become longer, more dispersed and more complex even without a corresponding acceleration in global GDP. The opportunity for shipping therefore lies not only in stronger demand, but in the geography of adaptation. The constraint is that adaptation itself is gradually becoming more expensive. The next phase of the cycle may consequently depend less on the economy's ability to absorb another shock than on whether it still has enough flexibility left to rearrange around it.
Data source: Doric