Global grain market

By Michalis Voutsinas

For most of the past three years, the global grain market has been defined by abundance. Successive record harvests across the Americas, a remarkable recovery in Black Sea exports despite the ongoing war, and the gradual unwinding of the 2022 commodity price shock combined to push food prices down by roughly a fifth between 2022 and 2025. That period of relative comfort is now being challenged on two fronts. In the Black Sea, hostilities have increasingly targeted shipping and port infrastructure, while across the Pacific, one of the strongest El Niño events of the modern era is approaching its peak. Neither development is unprecedented in isolation. Their coincidence, however, at a time when global inventories have already been drawn down, has made the market considerably more sensitive to further disruptions. The latest World Bank Commodity Markets Outlook captures the shift. Its food price index reached a three-year high in September before easing in October, although it remained 15 percent higher year-on-year. The Bank expects food prices to increase by 10 percent in 2026 and a further 7 percent in 2027, before declining by 5 percent in 2028, with risks tilted towards further increases. The FAO Food Price Index offers a similar indication. Having averaged 136.0 points in September, its highest reading since November 2022, the index slipped 1.2 percent month-on-month to 133.9 points in October. Nevertheless, it remained 5.9 percent higher year-onyear, although still 16.4 percent below its March 2022 peak.

The grain outlook cannot be considered independently of the broader energy and agricultural input shock that has characterised 2026. The conflict involving Iran and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz placed roughly one-third of global seaborne fertiliser trade at risk. Urea prices approximately doubled through April and, although nitrogen prices have since retreated towards pre-war levels, fertiliser shipments from the Gulf remain largely suspended. The timing of this disruption is particularly consequential. Higher input costs coincided with the 2026 planting season, while the effects of El Niño on agricultural yields typically materialise with a lag of six to twelve months. At the same time, elevated energy prices have intensified competition between food and fuel markets. Record US biofuel volume requirements and Indonesia’s decision to increase the palm oil content of biodiesel from 40 percent to 50 percent are diverting additional vegetable oil supplies towards energy production, tightening availability for food consumption.

For importing economies, the effects are already becoming apparent. Median food price inflation across emerging and developing economies reached 3.9 percent year-on-year in the third quarter, rising to 7.4 percent across the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan region. These are also among the economies most dependent on Black Sea wheat supplies. Grain prices increased by 9 percent quarter-onquarter in the third quarter of 2026, with wheat advancing by 13 percent and maize by 8 percent, primarily reflecting the escalation of hostilities around the Black Sea. The scale of the disruption is considerable. Russian attacks on the Odesa port cluster have removed approximately one-third of Ukraine’s grain export capacity, prompting the Agriculture Ministry to reduce its 2026-27 agricultural export forecast by 54 percent to 29.6 million tonnes. Wheat exports could fall by more than half to 8.3 million tonnes. The disruption is not confined to Ukrainian exports. Ukrainian strikes against Russian shipping in the Sea of Azov have constrained a route responsible for roughly a quarter of Russian grain exports, although shipments continue through Novorossiysk at a slower pace.

If the Black Sea represents the immediate geopolitical shock, El Niño constitutes a more prolonged source of uncertainty. NOAA assigns a greater than 90 percent probability to a very strong event persisting through the Northern Hemisphere winter of 2026-27, with approximately a 69 percent chance that its intensity will exceed every event recorded since 1950. Its agricultural implications are already emerging. India’s monsoon rainfall came in well below normal, and the USDA now projects the country’s rice production at 147 million tonnes, down 4.5 percent year-on-year. The World Bank anticipates a 2 percent decline in global rice production, which would mark the first annual contraction in a decade. Further south, Australia’s agricultural outlook is also deteriorating. ABARES expects winter crop production to decline by 12 percent to 61 million tonnes, with wheat exports projected to fall by approximately 31 percent to 19.3 million tonnes.

The aggregate supply figures help explain the market’s growing sensitivity to these developments. The World Bank projects global grain supply, comprising production and opening stocks, to decline by approximately 20 million tonnes in 2026-27, marking the first contraction in four years. US wheat production is projected to fall by 23 percent to its lowest level since 1970-71, while global wheat and maize output are expected to decrease by 2 percent and 3 percent respectively. Nevertheless, historical perspective remains important. Total global grain supply would still be the second-highest on record, maize stocks remain comfortably above the 2010-11 low of 13.2 percent, and the wheat and rice stock-to-use ratios of 34 percent and 37.2 percent respectively are far removed from levels associated with a genuine supply crisis. The global grain market is therefore not facing outright scarcity, but rather the erosion of the supply cushion that has absorbed successive disruptions in recent years. In such an environment, additional weather-related or trade disruptions are more likely to have a disproportionate effect on prices and trade flows.

For dry bulk, the implications are primarily geographical rather than volumetric. A reduction in grain production does not necessarily translate into an equivalent contraction in seaborne trade. The geographical distribution of exportable surpluses, and the origins from which importing countries source replacement supplies, are equally important. The Black Sea and Australia, two of the regions facing the greatest constraints, are predominantly short-haul suppliers to major importing markets. Any sustained reduction in their market share is therefore likely to encourage greater procurement from the Americas. Argentina, which typically benefits from improved rainfall conditions under El Niño, stands out as a potential beneficiary, alongside Brazilian maize and Canadian and European wheat. Such a shift in sourcing patterns would lengthen average voyage distances, providing support to tonne-mile demand. The indirect effects on shipping deserve similar attention. Higher geopolitical risk premiums, owners’ reluctance to call at Black Sea ports and increased war-risk insurance costs are effectively reducing fleet efficiency. Further afield, a poor Southern African maize harvest could generate additional import requirements. Potential Indian rice export restrictions would similarly redirect shipments towards alternative origins, particularly Thailand and Vietnam. Meanwhile, the near-halt in Gulf fertiliser exports has forced buyers to seek alternative supplies from more distant origins. There are, however, important countervailing factors. Higher grain prices will eventually constrain consumption and encourage demand rationing, particularly among price-sensitive importing economies.

At this juncture, the global grain market is entering 2027 in a markedly different position from that of the past three years. The abundance that previously cushioned successive shocks has diminished, while two major export regions face significant constraints, one geopolitical and potentially reversible, the other climatic and largely beyond policy control. With El Niño approaching its peak, Argentina’s harvest about to begin and the next Southern Hemisphere and Asian crops taking shape, the coming months will prove decisive in determining global supply. For dry bulk, the implications will depend less on overall grain volumes than on the geographical redistribution of trade. Greater reliance on the Americas at the expense of Black Sea and Australian supplies could lengthen average voyage distances, providing support to tonne-mile demand even if total volumes remain subdued. The extent of this support will ultimately hinge on the duration of export disruptions and the availability of alternative supplies.

Data source: Doric