China’s steel exports have been running at record levels in 2025, with shipments over January-July reaching the highest volume since records began in 1990. China is the world’s dominant steel exporter, with exports hitting a record 110.72 million tonnes in 2024 and continuing to rise, up 9.2 percent in the first half of 2025 to 58.147 million tonnes, driven by strong manufacturing-sector demand offsetting weak domestic construction. In July, exports maintained a record-breaking pace despite growing trade barriers being erected by countries wary of a flood of Chinese supply, rising to 9.84 million tonnes and taking the total so far this year to 67.98 million tonnes. On Friday, Baoshan Iron & Steel Co, China’s largest listed steelmaker, said it expected the country’s steel exports to stay above 100 million tonnes in 2025.
The scale and persistence of this surge inevitably invite comparisons with earlier historical episodes when other industrial giants – Britain, Germany, the United States, and Japan – turned to steel exports as outlets for excess capacity and industrial strength. While each case reflects its own unique economic circumstances, certain common themes emerge: rapid industrial growth, strong state involvement, international trade frictions, and eventual structural adjustments in the global steel market.
Britain was the first to play this role on a global scale. In the 19th century, as the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, Britain dominated global steel production and exports, supplying rails, machinery, and shipbuilding materials that underpinned the expansion of its empire and the broader global economy. British steel was not only a critical input for domestic industrialization but also a cornerstone of international trade, fueling the growth of railways in North America, infrastructure in the colonies, and naval supremacy. However, by the late 19th century, Britain’s position was increasingly challenged. German and American producers, equipped with newer technology and benefiting from larger domestic markets, began to outpace British steel in both cost and quality. The 20th century accelerated this decline: two world wars strained the industry, and by the 1960s and 1970s, British steel was beset by inefficiencies, high labor costs, and chronic underinvestment. Exports dwindled, and by the 1980s, after painful restructuring and privatization, Britain’s role as a dominant steel exporter had effectively ended. What remained was a more specialized industry, geared toward niche products rather than mass exports.
Germany’s rise as a steel exporter gained momentum in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. During the Second Industrial Revolution, the German Empire emerged as one of the world’s largest producers, rivalled only by Britain. Its exports were closely tied to industrialization, railway construction, and naval rearmament. After World War I, reparations and Versailles restrictions constrained production, but by the late 1920s, firms such as Krupp and Thyssen had regained prominence. Post-World War II, steel became a pillar of the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle). The Marshall Plan and the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 integrated German steel into a continental framework, boosting exports within Europe and to North America. Yet dependence on exports exposed Germany to global overcapacity and trade disputes. The steel crises of the 1970s and 1980s, driven by oil shocks and rising competition from newly industrialized economies, forced deep restructuring. Today, Germany remains a significant exporter, but with an emphasis on advanced steel grades and high technology rather than raw volume.
For much of the 20th century, the United States held an unparalleled position in steel. At its peak in the 1950s, it accounted for nearly half of global output, and while exports were important – supplying Europe under the Marshall Plan, fueling Japan’s reconstruction, and supporting Cold War allies – the U.S. market was overwhelmingly domestic in orientation. Massive infrastructure projects absorbed most of its steel, making exports secondary. From the late 1960s, however, the industry lost competitiveness. Rising labor costs, outdated facilities, and an influx of cheaper imports from Japan and later South Korea and Brazil undermined the U.S. position. By the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. steel industry underwent painful restructuring, shedding capacity and jobs, and its role as a major exporter diminished.
Japan’s postwar trajectory provides perhaps the closest parallel to China’s present experience. From the 1950s through the 1970s, Japan became the world’s largest steel exporter, supported by an export-led growth model coordinated by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Integrated coastal steelworks, such as Nippon Steel’s Oita Works, were designed to receive Australian iron ore and coking coal, giving Japan a seaborne orientation that also helped shape the bulk shipping industry. By the late 1960s, Japan had overtaken Germany as the world’s leading exporter, supplying millions of tonnes to the U.S., Europe, and developing Asia. These exports powered Japan’s wider economic miracle, supporting industries such as shipbuilding and automobiles. Yet rapid growth also generated trade frictions. In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. and European producers pressured governments to impose restrictions on Japanese imports, leading to voluntary export restraints. Rising energy costs, global overcapacity, and competition from South Korea, Taiwan, and eventually China eroded Japan’s dominance, prompting a shift toward high-value steel products rather than pure volume.
Against this historical backdrop, China’s current position stands out in both scale and context. With July 2025 shipments reaching 10 million tonnes, year-to-date exports are at record highs, surpassing levels last seen in the mid-2010s and exceeding historic peaks achieved by Britain, Germany, the U.S., and Japan in their respective eras. Several parallels are striking. Like Britain during its industrial zenith and Japan in the 1970s, China is grappling with domestic overcapacity, subdued internal demand, and a reliance on overseas markets to absorb surplus steel. Trade tensions are once again central: just as Japanese exports triggered restrictions in the U.S. and Europe, China now faces barriers from nearly 40 countries. The implications extend beyond trade disputes. For shipping markets, China’s surge has echoes of earlier industrial booms. Just as Japanese steel exports in the 1970s spurred bulk carrier demand and reshaped global routes, China’s dominance today underpins a significant share of dry bulk trade. But history also raises questions about sustainability. Britain, Germany, the U.S., and Japan all experienced phases where exports drove growth, only to be checked by overcapacity, rising costs, or foreign restrictions.
Chinese policymakers are already signaling such a transition. Government agencies have unveiled a plan to stabilize the steel industry for 2025- 2026, involving tighter control over production and support for advanced, high-tech output. Estimates suggest 2025 output will be under 980 million tonnes, at least 25 million tonnes lower than in 2024’s 1.005 billion tonnes. In January-July 2025, steel production fell 3.1 percent year-on-year to 594.47 million tonnes, a decline of 19 million tonnes compared with the same period in 2024. While earlier forecasts warned of a much steeper fall, of up to 50 million tonnes, the pace of decline has slowed. The policy framework points to “precise regulation” of capacity, closure of outdated facilities, and a push for higher-value products. Officials expect the added value of metallurgy to grow by around 4 percent annually in 2025-2026, suggesting a managed transition rather than a dramatic contraction.
These efforts underscore a tension at the heart of China’s steel story. On one hand, record exports are cushioning producers from weak domestic demand. On the other, rising protectionism abroad and the government’s own desire to curb excess capacity suggest that the current pace may not be sustainable. The historical experience suggests that reliance on bulk exports can only be a temporary phase. Each of those earlier giants eventually moved toward more specialized products, greater efficiency, and a reduced dependence on volume exports. Whether China follows the same path will depend on the balance between its domestic industrial policies and the constraints imposed by global trade partners. For now, its export surge is reshaping steel markets and shipping alike. Yet history also suggests that the adjustment will come, as sheer volume dominance gives way to a more specialized and technologically advanced role. The question is not whether this shift will happen, but when – and under what pressures it will be forced to occur.
Data source: Doric