By Eirini Diamantara & Dimitris Roumeliotis
The crude tanker tape has shifted from strong to structurally tight in a matter of weeks. As of late February, Baltic TCEs are printing at roughly USD 78k/day for Aframax, USD 129k/day for Suezmax and USD 177k/day for VLCCs, levels that historically coincide with geopolitical stress rather than seasonal strength. The key message for S&P is not the spike itself, but what it signals: effective supply of compliant tonnage is significantly smaller than headline fleet numbers imply.
Recent earnings have taken us back to rare territory. VLCC returns are trading at levels last meaningfully seen during the 2020 dislocation, while Suezmax and Aframax earnings are revisiting peaks associated with periods of Middle East instability. History shows that tanker markets react asymmetrically to geopolitical shocks. The 1990–91 Gulf War, the 2002–03 Iraq conflict and even the summer 2019 attacks in the MEG all triggered sharp rate spikes. The 12-day Israel/US–Iran conflict in June 2025 created a similar, though short-lived, surge. What differentiates today’s environment is that rates were already firm before tensions escalated. The Iran briefing underlines the scale of potential disruption. Between 15–16 million barrels per day of crude transit the Strait of Hormuz. Even though pipeline alternatives exist, Saudi Arabia’s East-West line, the UAE’s Fujairah pipeline and limited Iraqi and Iranian bypass routes, much of that capacity is already utilized. In an outright closure scenario, roughly 10 million bpd of crude exports could face restriction, alongside approximately 2.5 million bpd of CPP volumes. Even partial interference, AIS jamming or selective vessel targeting would likely reduce the number of owners willing to call MEG, immediately pushing freight premiums higher.
Crucially, this is unfolding in a market where the “mainstream” fleet is already constrained. Around 15% of VLCCs and Suezmaxes and roughly 25% of Aframax/LR2 tonnage have migrated into the shadow or restricted fleet. The briefing models that replacing only Iranian flows — approximately 1.75 million bpd in 2025, with mainstream ships would require 25–30 VLCCs and 15–20 Suezmaxes. That is a meaningful incremental call on available tonnage in a spot fleet that is already tight. Venezuela illustrates how quickly demand can shift into the compliant pool. Based on Signal Ocean data, in early 2026, Venezuelan barrels have increasingly returned to mainstream trade. January saw around 18 million barrels lifted, mainly into the US on Aframaxes. February volumes rose to roughly 21 million barrels, with flows distributed across the U.S. (35.3%), Spain (13.9%), India (13.6%), China (9.3%), and other countries (27.9%), utilizing Suezmaxes (41.1%), Aframaxes (34.1%), and VLCCs (22.8%) in parallel. These barrels had largely been handled by restricted tonnage in previous years. Their migration back into the legitimate market adds structural demand without requiring global trade growth.
Importantly, global seaborne crude volumes themselves are not materially higher year-on-year. The surge in earnings is therefore less about absolute demand expansion and more about risk premium, tonnage segmentation and fleet fragmentation. Owners are pricing uncertainty: potential insurance complications, war risk premiums, routing optionality and the possibility of further sanctions escalation. For asset values, this matters. Historically, geopolitical spikes that coincide with underlying fleet tightness tend to support second-hand prices more durably than purely cyclical rallies. If tensions remain elevated and shadow-to-mainstream migration continues, the market is not simply experiencing a rate spike, it is repricing effective supply. That distinction is critical for SnP positioning in the months ahead.
Data source: Xclusiv Shipbrokers Inc.